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Abstract
This paper studies a strategic model of marketing and product diffusion in social networks. We consider two firms offering
substitutable products which can improve their market share by seeding the key individuals in the market. Consumers update
their consumption level for each of the two products as the best response to the consumption of their neighbors in the previous
period. This results in linear update dynamics for the product consumption. Each consumer receives externality from the
consumption of each neighbor where the strength of the externality is higher for consumption of the products of the same
firm. We represent the above setting as a duopoly game between the firms and introduce a novel framework that allows for
sparse seeding to emerge as an equilibrium strategy. We then study the effect of the network structure on the optimal seeding
strategies and the extent to which the strategies can be sparsified. In particular, we derive conditions under which near Nash
equilibrium strategies can asymptotically lead to sparse seeding in large populations. The results are illustrated using a core-
periphery network.
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1 Introduction
Over the past few years, the problem of influence
and spread in networks has been subject to intense
study (Ballester et al., 2006; Bharathi et al., 2007;
Galeotti and Goyal, 2009; Kempe et al., 2003, 2005;
Chasparis and Shamma, 2010; Vetta, 2002). Fur-
thermore, modeling and analysis of the spread of
new strategies and behaviors via local coordination
games has been an ongoing field of research (Ellison,
1993; Kandori et al., 1993; Harsanyi and Selten, 1988;
Young, 1993, 2001, 2002; Montanari and Saberi, 2010;
Kleinberg, 2007). For example, in Lo´pez-Pintado (2006)
the authors show that the contagion of an action in
a random network depends on the distribution of the
connectivities. In Amini et al. (2009), authors provide
an upper bound on the proportion of agents adopting
a new product assuming a threshold model for prod-
uct adoption. Montanari and Saberi (2010) studies the
diffusion of innovation in social networks based on the
dynamics of coordination games and shows that innova-
tion spreads much more slowly on well-connected net-
1 This research was supported in part by a Vannevar Bush
Fellowship from the Office of Secretary of Defense, DARPA
Lagrange, and ARO MURI W911NF-12-1-0509.
work structures dominated by long-range links than in
low-dimensional ones dominated by geographic proxim-
ity, contrasting some earlier works on epidemic models
(e.g., (Ganesh et al., 2005; Draief et al., 2006)).
A game theoretic model of competition and prod-
uct adoption has been proposed in Goyal and Kearns
(2012). The authors use the proposed model to come
up with upper bounds on the price of anarchy and show
how network structure may increase the gap between
the initial budgets. Similarly, in Bimpikis et al. (2013),
the authors propose a game theoretic model for compe-
tition between firms, where firms can target their mar-
keting budgets toward attracting individual consumers
embedded in a social network. They subsequently pro-
vide conditions under which it is optimal for the firms
to asymmetrically target a subset of the individuals.
As another relevant work, (Chasparis and Shamma,
2010) considers a dynamical model of preferences in a
duopoly setting and characterize optimal policies for
both finite and infinite time horizons, studying the ef-
fect of endogenous network influences as well as network
uncertainties. The equilibria of network games with
linear best response dynamics have been completely
characterized in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014). Considering a
monopoly setting, optimal pricing policies are derived
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in Candogan et al. (2012) assuming quadratic utility
functions for the agents, which is a common theme in
game-theoretic social network analysis as also previ-
ously used in Ballester et al. (2006); Corbo et al. (2007)
for instance.
Despite the tremendous development made in the past
decade (see e.g., (Seeman and Singer, 2013; Fazeli et al.,
2017; Bharathi et al., 2007;Montanari and Saberi, 2010;
Chasparis and Shamma, 2010)), influence maximization
algorithms are typically devised under idealized assump-
tions regarding accessibility of individual consumers for
targeted advertisement (e.g., via seeding) as well as the
linearity of the cost function with respect to the size
of the influence on individual’s consumption behavior.
In practice, however, firms often have direct access only
to a small subset of consumers. In addition, the extent
to which firms can influence consumption behavior of
consumers is limited, no matter how much they spend
on seeding/advertisement. This can be more formally
stated as diminishing returns on changes in individual
consumption levels, which we model by assuming a con-
vex seeding cost function in our work. It seems also
quite compelling to investigate approaches that can sup-
port sparse seeding as (at least) near-optimal market-
ing strategies, in order to account for the limitations in
directly accessing individuals especially in large popula-
tions. 2
In this paper, we study strategic competition between
two firms seeking to maximize their product consump-
tion in a network. The consumption of each product by
each agent is the result of her myopic best response to
the previous consumptions of her peers. A firm can thus
improve its market share by targeting its advertising
budget toward seeding key individuals in the network,
whose consumption of the product can in turn incen-
tivize their peers to consume more of the same prod-
uct, subsequently affecting the consumption behavior of
the individuals all over the network via inter-agent in-
fluences. We model the problem above as a fixed-sum
game between the two firms, where each firm tries to
maximize a utility function which is a discounted sum
of its product consumption over time less a seeding cost
which is appropriately chosen to account for the dimin-
ishing return in seeding/advertisement budget as well.
We characterize the unique Nash equilibrium of the re-
sulting duopoly game in terms of the network structure
and the market price. The resultant seeding strategy
typically prescribes seeding all the agents (in an amount
proportional to their influence), which is rather an in-
feasible task. As a remedy, we propose studying the ε-
equilibria of the game and derive conditions under which
such equilibria can asymptotically lead to sparse seeding
strategies in large populations.
2 By sparse seeding we mean only seeding a subset of con-
sumers with an infinitesimal size compared to the size of the
whole population.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Sec-
tion 2, we present basic mathematical notations. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce our model and update dynamics for
agents by applying the myopic best response. We then
study the game played between the firms and how they
decide to seed key individuals in Section 4. Next, we de-
fine a near-Nash equilibrium concept as a relaxation of
the standard Nash equilibrium with the aim of expand-
ing the equilibrium set to include sparse seeding strate-
gies in Section 5. In Section 6, we consider the case of a
large population and characterize network structures for
which a pair of sparse seeding strategies can be asymp-
totically realized. The results are illustrated via an ex-
ample in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude the
paper.
2 Mathematical Notations
Throughout the paper, the discrete time index is de-
noted by k. The sets of real (integer), positive real (in-
teger), and strictly positive real (integer) numbers are
represented by R (Z), R+ (Z+) and R++ (Z++), respec-
tively. The set of natural numbers {i ∈ Z++ : i ≤ n}
is denoted by [n]. Bold letters, such as x or s, stand for
real-valued vectors. Capital letters, such asA orB, stand
for real-valued matrices. We use ‖x‖2 to denote the ℓ
2-
norm of vector x. We denote the number of nonzero el-
ements in vector x by ‖x‖0. The n-by-n identity matrix
is denoted by In. Also, we represent the n-by-1 vector of
ones by 1n and the n-by-1 and n-by-n matrices of zeros
by 0n and 0n×n, respectively. The transpose of matrix
A is denoted by A⊤. For two matrices A and B, we de-
note the Hadamard product by A◦B and the Kronecker
product by A⊗B.
3 Spread Dynamics
We consider a social network consisting of a group of n
consumers (agents) denoted by V = [n]. The relationship
among agents is given by a weighted directed graph G =
(V , E , w). The weighted adjacencymatrix of G is denoted
by G where its i, j-th entry denoted by gij = w((i, j)) if
(i, j) ∈ E otherwise gij = 0. Link weight gij presents the
strength of the influence of agent j on i.
We assume there are two competing firms producing
product a and b, respectively. Let dini =
∑
j gij and
douti =
∑
j gji denote the in-degree and out-degree
of node i, respectively. Assume x¯i(k) and xi(k) de-
note agent i’s consumption of product a and b at time
k ∈ Z++, respectively. The initial consumption of agent
i from each product is determined by the effort made
by each firm in seeding/marketing its product to agent
i at time 0, and are denoted by s¯i and si. We refer to s¯i
and si as the control/seeding of firm a and b on agent i,
respectively. The relation between the controls and the
states is motivated by (Chasparis and Shamma, 2010)
2
on social networks. We consider a convex cost function
c(s) for seeding to reflect the diminishing return of seed-
ing/advertisement budget on changing the consumption
behavior in the population. The cost c(s) reflects the
monetary value required to increase the consumption of
the agents in the population by amount s. For the sake
of simplicity, we develop our results for a quadratic cost
function of the form c(s) = 12‖s‖
2
2.
The total utility of agent i from taking action xi is given
by
ui(x¯i(k), x¯−i(k)) = αx¯i(k)−
1
2
(x¯i(k))
2
+ x¯i(k)
∑
j∼i
gij
(
x¯j(k) + βxj(k)
)
− p x¯i(k)
where 0 ≤ β < 1. In the above equation x¯−i denotes an
action vector of all agents but agent i. The first part of
the utility (αx¯i(k) −
1
2 (x¯i(k))
2
) represents the normal-
ized second order approximation of a concave self-utility
function, as is commonly used in the literature. The fact
that externality is weaker for consuming different prod-
ucts is captured by β < 1. Finally, the price p represents
the common market price for the products.
3.1 Myopic Best Response Dynamics
We assume agents repeatedly apply myopic best re-
sponse to the consumption levels of their neighbors in
the previous stage to update their consumption of each
product, that is,
x¯i(k + 1) ∈ arg max
x∈Rn
+
ui (x, x¯−i(k)) ,
and
xi(k + 1) ∈ arg max
x∈Rn
+
ui
(
x,x−i(k)
)
.
Consumption levels for agent i at time k + 1 thus find
the following linear dynamics:
x¯i(k + 1) = (α− p) +
∑
j∼i
gij
(
x¯j(k) + βxj(k)
)
.
and
xi(k + 1) = (α− p) +
∑
j∼i
gij
(
xj(k) + βx¯j(k)
)
.
This results in the following closed-form update dynam-
ics:{
x¯(k + 1) = (α− p)1n + Gx¯(k) + βGx(k)
x(k + 1) = (α− p)1n + Gx(k) + βGx¯(k)
(1)
where x¯(0) = s¯ and x(0) = s.
Assumption 1 We assume α ≥ p to guarantee that
x¯i(k) and xi(k) are non-negative for all feasible initial
seedings.
In the next section, we show how firms can exploit the
structure of the network to maximize their product con-
sumption, and we then characterize the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game played between these two firms.
We first recall the definition of the Katz-Bonacich cen-
trality measure.
Definition 1 For a given attenuation factor α less than
the reciprocal of the absolute value of the largest eigen-
value of the adjacency matrix G ∈ Rn×n+ , the Katz-
Bonacich centrality is given by
ckatz(G,α) =
(
In − αG
⊤
)−1
1n.
Definition 2 For a given subset S ⊆ V, we define an
indicator binary n× 1 vector 1S as follows:
1S = [si]n×1, si =
{
1 if i ∈ S
0, i ∈ [n] \ S
We then use these definitions in the next section to char-
acterize equilibrium strategies in a duopoly game be-
tween the firms.
4 Optimal Seeding Strategies
This section describes the game between two firms where
each firm aims to maximize the consumption of its prod-
uct over an infinite horizon. Each firm can invest in pro-
moting its product by seeding some of the agents. Ini-
tial seeding could be viewed as free offers to promote
the product in the social networks. We thus consider
the problem of deriving optimal advertising policies for
the spread of innovations/consumption in a network. In
Chasparis and Shamma (2010), an analytical solution to
the optimal advertising problem in the absence of a com-
peting firm is provided, and it is shown that the solution
can be related to previously introduced centrality mea-
sures in sociology.
We define the utility of each firm as the discounted sum
of its product consumption over time minus the squared
norm of its seeding, which are defined formally as follows:
U¯ = p
(
∞∑
k=1
δk1⊤n x¯(k)
)
−
1
2
‖s¯‖22, (2)
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and
U = p
(
∞∑
k=1
δk1⊤nx(k)
)
−
1
2
‖s‖22. (3)
Definition 3 Apair of seeding strategies (s¯⋆, s⋆) ∈ Rn+×
R
n
+ is said to be a Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game
described above if none of the players can improve her
payoff by unilaterally deviating from her strategy. That
is,
U(s¯⋆, s) ≤ U(s¯⋆, s⋆), ∀ s ∈ Rn+,
and
U¯(s¯, s⋆) ≤ U¯(s¯⋆, s⋆), ∀ s¯ ∈ Rn+.
Assumption 2 We assume that the absolute value of
the largest eigenvalue of G is less than or equal to Λmax
where
0 < Λmax <
1
δ(1 + β)
.
We then use Assumption 2 to get well-defined centrality
measures for the graph with adjacency G, and make the
matrix pencil in Definition 1 invertible.
In the following lemma, an equilibrium strategy for the
duopoly game between the firms is characterized based
on the node centrality measures.
Lemma 1 Consider two firms with closed-form update
dynamics 1, and utility functions U¯ and U given by (2)
and (3), respectively. The sensitivity of the utilities with
respect to the individual seedings are given by
∂U¯
∂s¯i
= p ci − s¯i,
and
∂U
∂si
= p ci − si,
where cnew = [c1, . . . , cn]
⊤ with
cnew =
1
2
ckatz (G, δ(1 − β))+
1
2
ckatz (G, δ(1 + β)) . (4)
Proof 1 Let us define the following Jacobian matrices
for firm a as follows:
x¯(k) :=
∂(x¯(k))
∂s¯
,
and
X¯(k) :=
∂
∑k
t=1 δ
tx¯(t)
∂s¯
=
k∑
t=1
δtx¯(t). (5)
Similarly, we define the following Jacobian matrices for
firm b:
x(k) :=
∂(x(k))
∂s¯
,
and
X(k) :=
∂
∑k
t=1 δ
tx(t)
∂s¯
=
k∑
t=1
δtx(t). (6)
Next, we write the update dynamics for x¯ and x according
to their definitions and update dynamics (1):
{
x¯(k + 1) = x¯(k)G⊤ + x(k)βG⊤
x(k + 1) = x(k)G⊤ + x¯(k)βG⊤
(7)
Then, based on update dynamics (7), (5) and (6) we get
{
X¯(∞)− x¯(0) = δX¯(∞)G⊤ + δX(∞)βG⊤
X(∞)− x(0) = δX(∞)G⊤ + δX¯(∞)βG⊤
where x¯(0) = In, and x(0) = 0n×n. We can rewrite (8)
in the following compact form
[
X¯(∞) X(∞)
](
I2n − δ
[
G⊤ βG⊤
βG⊤ G⊤
])
=
[
In 0n×n
]
.
From this, it follows that
X¯(∞) =
[
In 0n×n
]I2n − δ

 G
⊤ βG⊤
βG⊤ G⊤




−1 
 In
0n×n

 .
(9)
We then use the following property to simplify (9)
(A⊗B)(C ⊗D) = (AC) ⊗ (BD). (10)
Let us define
A :=
[
G⊤ βG⊤
βG⊤ G⊤
]
=
[
1 β
β 1
]
⊗G⊤. (11)
based on (10) and (11), we get
At =
([
1 β
β 1
]
⊗G⊤
)t
=
[
1 β
β 1
]t
⊗ (G⊤)t. (12)
With a simple calculation we get:
[
1 0
] [1 β
β 1
]t [
1
0
]
=
1
2
(
(1− β)t + (1 + β)t
)
. (13)
Next by expanding (I − δA)−1 and then applying (10),
4
(12), and (13), it follows that
[
In 0n×n
](
I2n − δ
[
G⊤ βG⊤
βG⊤ G⊤
])−1 [
1n
0n
]
=
1
2
(
In − δ(1 − β)G
⊤
)−1
1n
+
1
2
(
In − δ(1 + β)G
⊤
)−1
1n
=
1
2
ckatz (G, δ(1 − β)) +
1
2
ckatz (G, δ(1 + β)) .
By substituting (9) in (15), we have
X(∞)1n =
1
2
ckatz (G, δ(1 − β))+
1
2
ckatz (G, δ(1 + β)) .
(14)
From (2), we get
∂U¯
∂s¯
= p X¯(∞)1n − s¯. (15)
Finally, by substituting (14) in (15), we get the desired
result.
Theorem 1 Consider two firmswith closed-form update
dynamics (1), and utility functions U¯ and U given by (2)
and (3), respectively. The game between firms admits the
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the form
s¯⋆ = s⋆ = pcnew,
where bi-product centrality vector cnew is given by (4).
Proof 2 The proof is a direct consequence of Lemma 1.
5 Sparse Seeding
In what follows, we first define a near-Nash equilibrium
concept as a relaxation of the standard Nash equilibrium
defined in Definition 3, with the aim of expanding the
equilibrium set to include sparse seeding strategies (cf.
(Daskalakis et al., 2006)). In what follows, we will make
this statement formal.
Definition 4 Given ε ∈ R+, a pair of seeding strategies
(s¯⋆, s⋆) ∈ Rn+ × R
n
+ is said to be ε-equilibrium of the
duopoly game described in Section 4 if none of the players
can improve her payoff by an amount more than ε fraction
of her current payoff, by unilaterally deviating from her
strategy. That is,
U(s¯⋆, s) ≤ (1 + ε)U(s¯⋆, s⋆), ∀ s ∈ Rn+,
and
U¯(s¯, s⋆) ≤ (1 + ε) U¯(s¯⋆, s⋆), ∀ s¯ ∈ Rn+.
Every Nash Equilibrium is equivalent to a ε-equilibrium
where ε = 0.
The next lemma provides a closed-form expression for
the utility functions of the firms when there is not any
seeding.
Lemma 2 Assume s¯ = s = 0n, then the utility of firm
a is reduced to
U¯(0n,0n) =
(αp− p2)δ
1− δ
1⊤n ckatz(G, δ(1 + β)),
where centrality ckatz(G, ·) is given by Definition 1.
Proof 3 Let us assume s¯ = s = 0n, then
∞∑
k=1
δk
[
x¯(k)
x(k)
]
=
δ(α− p)
1− δ
(I2n − δA)
−1
[
1n
1n
]
,
where A is given by (11). With a simple calculation we
get: [
1 0
] [1 β
β 1
]k [
1
1
]
= (1 + β)k.
Then, based on the definition of the utility, we have
U¯(0n,0n) =
δ(α− p)
1− δ
[
1 0
]
(I2n − δA)
−1
[
1
1
]
= p
δ(α− p)
1− δ
1⊤n ckatz(G, δ(1 + β)).
Theorem 2 Consider two firms with closed-form update
dynamics (1), and utility functions U¯ and U given by (2)
and (3), respectively. For any given sets S¯,S ⊆ [n], the
game between the firms admits a ε-equilibrium of the form
s¯⋆ = p (cnew ◦ 1S¯), and s
⋆ = p (cnew ◦ 1S), (16)
where cnew is given by (4), if and only if
ε ≥ max(τ¯ , τ),
where
τ¯ :=
∑
i/∈S¯ c
2
i
δ(α−p)
2p(1−δ)1
⊤
n ckatz(G, δ(1 + β)) +
∑
i∈S¯ c
2
i
,
τ :=
∑
i/∈S c
2
i
δ(α−p)
2p(1−δ)1
⊤
n ckatz(G, δ(1 + β)) +
∑
i∈S c
2
i
,
and centrality ckatz is given in Definition 1.
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Proof 4 We first show that
max
s¯∈Rn
+
(
U¯(s¯, s⋆)− U¯(s¯⋆, s⋆)
)
=
1
2
p2
∑
i/∈S
c2i , (17)
which results in the following best response for firm a
s¯i = pci, (18)
where i ∈ [n]. Therefore, using (18), the superposition
property, and Lemma 2, it follows that
max
s¯∈Rn
+
U¯(s¯, s⋆) = U¯(0n,0n) +
1
2
p2
∑
i/∈S
c2i
=
(αp− p2)δ
1− δ
1⊤n ckatz(G, δ(1 + β)) +
1
2
p2
∑
i/∈S
c2i .(19)
Then using (17), (19) and Definition 4, we get the desired
result.
6 Asymptotically Realizable Sparse Equilibria
In this section, we consider the case of a large population
for which n → ∞. We characterize network structures
for which a pair of sparse seeding strategies can be real-
ized as the limit of a sequence of ε-equilibria with ǫ→ 0.
In what follows, we will make this statement formal.
Definition 5 We call a pair of ε-equilibrium seeding
strategies (s¯⋆, s⋆) asymptotically sparse-realizable (ASR)
if and only if ‖s¯⋆‖0 = O(1), ‖s
⋆‖0 = O(1) and ε =
o(1). 3
We begin our analysis by a lemma that presents a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for a pair of strategies
be asymptotically sparse-realizable in terms of the bi-
product centrality (4).
Lemma 3 A pair of strategies (s¯⋆, s⋆) is asymptotically
sparse-realizable if and only if
max
{ ∑
i/∈S¯ c
2
i∑
i∈[n] c
2
i
,
∑
i/∈S c
2
i∑
i∈[n] c
2
i
}
= o(1), (20)
where c = [c1, · · · , cn]
⊤ is given by (4), S¯ = {i | s¯⋆i 6= 0},
|S¯| = O(1), S = {i | s¯⋆i 6= 0}, and |S| = O(1).
Proof 5 We first start with the fact that ε = o(1) if and
only if εε+1 = o(1). Therefore, the pair of ε-equilibrium
3 Given functions f(·) and g(·), the asymptotic no-
tations f(n) = O(g(n)) and f(n) = o(g(n)) mean
lim supn→∞
∣∣∣ f(n)g(n)
∣∣∣ < ∞ and limn→∞
∣∣∣ f(n)g(n)
∣∣∣ = 0, respec-
tively.
seeding strategies is asymptotically sparse-realizable if
and only if
∑
i/∈S c
2
i
δ(α−p)
2p(1−δ)
1⊤n ckatz(G, δ(1 + β)) +
∑
i∈[n] c
2
i
= o(1).
Let us recall
c = [c1, · · · , cn]
⊤
:=
1
2
ckatz (G, δ(1 − β)) +
1
2
ckatz (G, δ(1 + β)) ,
where a = [a1, · · · , an]
⊤ := ckatz (G, δ(1− β)), and
b = [b1, · · · , bn]
⊤ := ckatz (G, δ(1 + β)). It can be seen
that ∑
i∈[n]
ai ≤ 2
∑
i∈[n]
ci ≤ 2
∑
i∈[n]
c2i ,
where in the last inequality, we use the fact that ci ≥ 1.
∑
i/∈S c
2
i∑
i∈[n] c
2
i
≥
∑
i/∈S c
2
i∑
i∈[n] c
2
i + κ
∑
i∈[n] ai
≥
∑
i/∈S c
2
i
(1 + 2κ)
∑
i∈[n] c
2
i
where κ = δ(α−p)2p(1−δ) ≥ 0.
As the next result, we derive a necessary condition for the
existence of asymptotically sparse-realizable equilibrium
strategies.
Proposition 1 Let doutmax = maxi∈[n] d
out
i , and suppose
that
δ(1 + β) doutmax < 1.
Then, there exists no pair of ε-equilibrium seeding strate-
gies that is asymptotically sparse-realizable.
Proof 6 It can be seen that
1 + δβdouti ≤ ci ≤
1− δβdoutmax
(1− δ(1 + β)doutmax)(1− δ(1− β)doutmax)
,
where c = [c1, · · · , cn] is given by (4). Therefore, using
these inequalities, it can be seen that if δ(1+β)doutmax < 1
then ci’s are bounded; therefore (20) does not hold. This
completes the proof.
This result implies that networks with bounded out-
degree (i.e., doutmax = O(1)) are not asymptotically sparse-
realizable.
We conclude this section by stating a sufficient condi-
tion for the existence of asymptotically sparse-realizable
equilibrium strategies.
6
Fig. 1. A core-periphery network consisting of three commu-
nities each with one role model that influences every com-
munity member by g. Each role model herself is influenced
by the role model of another community by amount g.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the pair of seeding strate-
gies (16) is asymptotically sparse-realizable. Then,
max
i∈[n]
ci = O(n),
where c = [c1, · · · , cn]
⊤ is given by (4).
Proof 7 The proof is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.
7 Discussion
We illustrate our results using a core-periphery network
structure, that is a network with few highly intercon-
nected and many sparsely connected nodes.
Consider a network consisting of χ communities of size
m denoted by Cr = {(r − 1)m+ 1, · · · , rm} for r ∈ [χ].
Consumption levels of the agents within each commu-
nity are influenced by an agent called a role model that
induces an externality effect of magnitude g on each con-
sumer. Consumption levels of role models themselves are
each influenced by the consumption of a role model in
another community whose structure is assumed to form
a cycle. Let agent rm be the role model in community Cr
for r ∈ [χ]. The corresponding entries of the adjacency
matrix G are given by
gij=


g, for i ∈ Cr \ {rm} and j = rm
g, for (i, j)∈{((r+1)m, rm)|r∈ [χ−1]}∪{(m,χm)}
0, otherwise
The case χ = 3 is depicted in Fig. 1.
Characterizing the equilibrium seeding strategies (both
Nash equilibrium and ε-equilibria) requires finding cen-
trality vectors
a =
(
In − δ(1 − β)G
⊤
)−1
1n,
and
b =
(
In − δ(1 + β)G
⊤
)−1
1n,
where n = χm. Let aL and aF be the corresponding cen-
tralities of a role model and a periphery consumer in a,
respectively. A periphery consumer does not induce ex-
ternality on any other consumer, resulting in a centrality
of aF = 1. For a role model, on the other hand, from the
definition of Katz-Bonacich centrality we can obtain
aL = 1 + (m− 1)δ(1− β)g + δ(1 − β)gaL,
resulting in aL =
1+(m−1)δ(1−β)g
1−δ(1−β)g . Similarly, we can
find bF = 1 and bL =
1+(m−1)δ(1+β)g
1−δ(1+β)g .
Applying Theorem 1, the symmetric Nash equilibrium
strategy thus involves seeding a periphery consumer by
s⋆F = s¯
⋆
F = p, and every role model by an amount of
s⋆L = s¯
⋆
L =
p
2
(
1+(m−1)δ(1−β)g
1− δ(1− β)g
+
1+(m−1)δ(1+β)g
1− δ(1 + β)g
)
.(21)
Keeping the number of communities χ fixed and shift-
ing m→∞, we can use Lemma 3 to verify that seeding
only the χ role models according to (21) is an asymp-
totically sparse-realizable equilibrium strategy. Finally,
Assumption 2 requires δ(1 + β)λmax(G) < 1 which can
be satisfied if δ(1 + β)g < 1 noting that λmax(G) = g
(this follows from dini = g for all i ∈ [n]).
8 Conclusion And Future Work
We proposed and studied a strategic model of marketing
and product consumption in social networks. Two firms
offer substitutable products and compete to maximize
the consumption of their products in a social network.
Consumers are myopic and update their consumption
level as the best response to the consumption of their
neighbors in the previous period. This results in linear
update dynamics for the product consumption. More-
over, each consumer receives externality from the con-
sumption of each neighbor; the externality is stronger
for consumption of the same product. Firms can im-
prove their market share by seeding the key consumers
in the market, as their consumption will incentivize the
consumption of the same product by their peers given
the inter-agent externalities, which in turn can affect
the consumption behavior all over the network. We rep-
resented the above setting as a duopoly game between
the firms and introduced a novel framework that allows
for sparse seeding to asymptotically emerge as an equi-
librium strategy. We then studied the effect of the net-
work structure on the optimal seeding strategies and
the extent to which these strategies could be sparsi-
fied, under the proposed equilibrium concept. In partic-
ular, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under
which ε-Nash equilibrium strategies can asymptotically
lead to sparse seeding in large populations. The results
were demonstrated using a large core-periphery network
structure with few highly connected and many sparsely
connected nodes. Extending our analysis to time-varying
seeding strategies (recurring seeding), networks with un-
certainties (e.g., in valuations of consumers about the
products), and oligopoly setting are some of the poten-
tial venues for future research.
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